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A  CRITICAL STUDY OF PHYSICAL PARTICIPATION IN BLAST 
THEORY ’S CAN YOU SEE ME NOW?  
 
Piotr Woycicki* 
 
INTRO DUCT IO N  
 
This article will explore how avant-garde artistic practices in the field of mixed reality  
performance, namely pervasive games such as Blast Theory’s 2003 Can You See Me 
Now?, critically engage with the proliferation and implementation of virtual 
technologies in everyday life, in particular focusing on the tension between the 
physical and virtual aspects of participation in these environments. In the context of 
these changes it is important to ask where the performance of everyday life is taking 
place. I will argue that there is a cultural shift resulting from the global, massive 
implementation of these technologies towards a virtualisation of everyday life 
performance and a progressive re-calibration of sensitivities away from the immediate 
material and physical domains of experience. Antonio Damasio’s (2000) theory of 
consciousness, as outlined in his seminal work The Feeling of What Happens: Body 
and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness, provides me with a theoretical tool to 
analyse the re-calibration of sensitivities of embodiment and physical participation. 
This article will focus on an exposition of virtual and physical modes of engagement 
in Can You See Me Now? that inspires a critical reflexivity on physical participation in 
the contemporary cultural landscape, where technology and virtual reality become 
progressively dominant ways of mediating reality. Finally, the ethical implications 
of the aforementioned cultural shift will be explored through Emmanuel Lévinas’ 
face-to-face encounter with the Other. This article will address the intersection 
between performing arts and science by exploring how neuroscientific theories may 
serve as a methodology for exploring different paradigms and modes of audience 
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engagement with mixed reality performance. In effect, neuroscientific theory and 
performance analysis grounded in intermedial paradigms will form a hybrid approach 
for the theorisation of technologically driven contemporary performance. 
 
M IX ED R EAL IT Y P ERF O RM AN CE S  
 
Gabriella Giannachi and Steve Benford define mixed reality performance ‘as the 
staging of theatrical performances in mixed reality environments’ (Benford and 
Giannachi 2011, 2). Figure 1 illustrates the continuum of mixed reality environments, 
providing a good taxonomical framework for their classification. 
I propose that mixed reality performances are hybrid forms, combining instances 
of reality, augmented reality and virtual reality performance. Following the logic of 
the spectrum, the left-hand of the continuum side could include instances of 
augmented reality such as AR Smartphone Apps, interactive city maps, and so 
forth. The right-hand side could incorporate massive multiplayer online role-play 
games and virtual reality environments. Mixed reality performances differ from 
those in virtual reality as they do not alienate spectators/participants from physical 
participation by immersing them ‘into the computer-generated body of an avatar’ 
(Grau 2003, 245). Instead, the emphasis is placed on physical performance by 
explicitly foregrounding the physical presence of the spectator’s ‘body’ and its 
materiality by integrating its dynamics as a constitutive part of the virtual space. 
 
Figure 1. Mixed reality continuum based on Milgram and Kishino’s (1994) concept. 
Note: GPS, global positioning systems; MMORGS, massive multiplayer online role-play 
games; SNS, social networking services. Courtesy of Benford and Gianacchi (2011). 
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ALI ENA TI ON I N TH E N E W  M ED IA LA ND SCA PE  
 
By considering the increasing popularity of mainstream mixed reality platforms 
and their integration into daily routines via a global network, it becomes possible 
to talk about a global cybernetic theatre; a world as a virtual cyberstage, where 
significant parts and aspects of performance of everyday life take place. 
Erving Goffman’s concept of social performativity developed in the 1960s, 
proposing that life can be seen ‘as an interplay of behaviours where players with 
different motives rehearse their actions, manoeuvre to present themselves advantageously, 
and often perform at cross purposes with one another’ (Goffman in 
Schechner 2002, 174). This concept can be applied directly to virtual environments, 
where people perform, construct and re-invent their identities. Douglas Kellner 
(1992) argued that ‘traditionally’ identity has been perceived as stable, fixed and 
solid. In the age of modernity, this interpretation of identity was partially replaced 
by the notion that identities are ‘mobile, multiple, personal, self-reflexive, and 
subject to change and innovation’ (1992, 143). Even though the experience of these 
virtual environments integrates both physical and virtual dimensions, they arguably 
tend to ‘emphasise’ the virtual stage as the main site of performance. As Oliver Grau 
comments ‘many virtual environments reduce the observer to a disembodied state 
within a Cartesian space that is clear for miles around and often quite empty’ (2003, 
192). It could be the case that physical participation becomes secondary or repressed 
in these virtual environments, as in the case of immersive games or social networking 
sites where so-called ‘real life’ turns into a concealed ‘backstage’. In her book Alone 
Together, Sherry Turkle exemplifies this cultural tendency with a case of a college 
student whose online existence became a dominant part of his everyday life. She 
recounts that: 
 
he played four avatars, distributed across three different online worlds. He always had 
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these worlds open as windows on his computer screen along with his schoolwork, e-mail 
program, and favorite games. He cycled easily through them. He told me that RL ‘is 
just one more window.’ And, he added, ‘it’s not usually my best one’. (Turkle 2011, xii) 
 
This is not to say that one is not physically present embodying a space whilst in front 
of a computer screen, but there seems to be a certain hierarchy of experience at play 
when it comes to mainstream virtual environments, where the cognitive immersion 
with a virtual environment is being prioritised. Although it is difficult to encapsulate 
how different people respond to virtual environments, design hints at an implicit 
hierarchisation of these different components encouraging a particular mode of 
engagement, which emphasises cognitive immersion. 
 
The contemporary cultural landscape is filled with augmented reality platforms 
and technologies ranging from the widespread use of global positioning systems 
(GPS), particularly locative media contained in smartphones, to online virtual 
environments such as massive multiplayer games, to virtual working environments, 
ubiquitous computing and social networking sites. In western societies – where the 
speed of communication, virtualisation of capital and, by extension, other spheres of 
society are becoming the paradigms of progress – the proliferation of virtual 
technologies has contributed to a cultural shift. What we are witnessing is an increase 
in hours per week spent by people on transferring their social, recreational and work 
activities into new media environments. The virtual performance of everyday life is 
progressively moving upstage, whilst the physical side of these experiences are taking 
a backstage role in what could be seen as a hierarchised model of theatre. 
Katherine N. Hayles’ provocative observations on the posthuman condition 
emphasise this cultural shift away from the physical into the digital/virtual. She 
claims that ‘the great dream and promise of information is that it can be free from 
the material constraints that govern the mortal world’ (Hayles 1999, 13). To what 
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extent, however, virtual experiences can become ‘liberated’ from the constraints of 
materiality, both spatially and temporarily, is a very contestable issue. Elizabeth 
Grosz has argued that if ‘we don’t just have bodies, […] but are bodies, there can 
never be the threat of displacing the body in favour of mind or abandoning the real 
for the virtual’ (2000, 86). It is hard to discern from Grosz’s account what she 
actually means by ‘the body’. As Susan Melrose points out, the use of the term ‘the 
body’ is often unproblematised in performance criticism (2011, 6). She suggests 
abandoning the notion of the body as a noun defined by its material functions and 
viewing the body from a Bergsonian–Deleuzian perspective, which sees the body as a 
‘living individuality’, ‘a complex relation between differential velocities’ and which 
has ‘the capacity for affecting and being affected’ (2011, 8). In this context, the body 
becomes a technology for generating perception – a perceptual apparatus with a 
focus on the affective, intuitive, immediate and instinctual sphere of response and 
signal interpretation. For the purposes of my discussion I would like to consider ‘the 
body’ as a medium, or more precisely as a technology; a biological perceptual 
apparatus that is focused on affective pre-conscious experiences – in effect, I will 
adopt a neuroscientific approach that effaces the mind/body dualism by positioning 
the body as a stratum of the perceptual process. 
 
Consciousness can be located within a triune anatomical model of the brain. In 
The Triune Brain in Evolution, Paul MacLean postulated that the triune brain 
consists of the following parts, which evolved in succession: the reptilian complex, 
the paleomammalian complex (limbic system) and the neomammalian complex (neocortex) 
(MacLean 1990, 9). In this structure, the reptilian complex functions 
according to simple cause-and-effect impulses such as fight or flight. It operates by 
instinct and does not require considered decision-making, but is based on reflex 
action. This complex forms a system of interrelated parts, such as ‘the brain stem, 
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hypothalamus, and basal forebrain’ (Damasio 2000, 22) that are also responsible for 
the regulation of the body’s internal states and life support functions. The limbic 
system (the paleomammalian complex or the ‘old-mammalian brain’) comprises a 
number of parts such as the amygdala, cingulate gyrus and the limbic cortex that are 
largely responsible for the processing of emotions. For instance, the amygdala is 
crucial to ‘recognizing fear in facial expressions, to being conditioned by fear, and 
even to expressing fear’ (Damasio 2000, 62). The neomammalian complex (neocortex), 
where Damasio places ‘the stream of thoughts’ (2000, 171), is where our 
long-term memory and higher mental functions are located, which include language 
and rational thought, both of which play a key role in defining us as higher 
conscious beings. Damasio put forward a dual model of consciousness split into two 
kinds, the core and the extended. According to Damasio, core consciousness 
‘provides the organism with a sense of self about one moment – now – and about 
one place – here’ (2000, 16). Extended consciousness, on the other hand, which 
consists of many levels and grades: 
 
provides the organism with an elaborate sense of self and identity and a person, you or 
me, no less – and places that person at a point in the individual historical time, richly 
aware of the lived past and of the anticipated future, and keenly cognisant of the world 
beside it. (Damasio 2000, 16) 
 
Damasio outlines a hierarchy of sensorial engagements that constitute the mechanics 
behind the generation of consciousness. This hierarchy is insightful when exploring 
the notion of embodiment since it splits sensorial engagement into various layers 
that can be aligned to constitute Damasio’s metaphor of the ‘movie-in-the-brain’ 
(2000, 9), a metaphor for the functioning of the whole nervous system comprising 
many sensory tracks and sensory portals such as ‘sight, sound, taste, touch, and 
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olfaction, touch, inner senses’ (2000, 9). 
 
The levels of consciousness I have described are mapped onto what Damasio 
calls ‘Levels of Life Regulation’ (2000, 55). These comprise four distinct states of: 
consciousness, ‘stereotyped, patterns of response, which include metabolic regulation, 
reflexes, pain, pleasure drives, motivations’ (2000, 55); emotions, such as 
‘secondary emotions, primary emotions and background emotions’ (2000, 55); 
feelings, which are subdivided into unconscious representations of emotions and a 
conscious awareness of having an emotion (feeling); and finally high reason, where 
conscious responses are made in relation to sensory intake. This hierarchical model, 
where one level of consciousness builds upon a preceding state, offers an approach to 
analyse how the body/brain apparatus processes signals. In this model the inner 
workings of consciousness are inextricably linked with physical manifestations. For 
instance, lower level background emotions such as a person feeling ‘tense’, ‘edgy’, 
‘discouraged’, ‘enthusiastic’, ‘down’ or ‘cheerful’ can manifest themselves in ‘subtle 
details of body posture, speed and contour of movements, minimal changes in the 
amount and speed of eye movements’ (Damasio 2000, 52). Conversely, these states 
can be induced through prolonged physical effort and interaction with the 
environment. Damasio’s model articulates the various levels of ‘conscious’ engagement 
of the subject with its surroundings. In this article I will attempt to apply this 
model to a discussion of physical participation and sensorial experience in the mixed 
reality performance Can You See Me Now?. 
 
CAN YO U SE E ME NO W ?  
 
Designed and performed by Blast Theory in collaboration with the Mixed Realities 
Lab, Can You See Me Now? – first performed in Sheffield in 2001 – is a hybrid of a 
pervasive game and a contemporary site-specific performance that was performed in 
8 
 
a number of cities across the world.1 
 
The performance involved a mixed reality form of chase between runners in a 
real city and players controlling avatars behind desktop computers. In Can You See 
Me Now? the players/audience had access to a virtual city where their avatars were 
chased by four Blast Theory performers/runners located in a designated area of a 
real city. The runners used handheld computers with WIFI technology and GPS to 
assist them in capturing the participants, and often performed using rehearsed 
behaviours that constituted part of the framework of the project. The online 
environment allowed the players to move at set speeds, to see the location of other 
player’s avatars and the runners, and to exchange text messages with each other. As 
a rule the players were not allowed to enter buildings and the game area was 
normally only approximately 200 m × 200 m, occasionally increasing to 400 m × 400 
m limited by the technological framework. 
 
The runners were able to see the players’ virtual avatars on a map, read 
their messages and also communicate with each other via walkie-talkies. The walkietalkie 
audio from the runners went on to a live stream, so players online could hear 
and communicate to runners via text. If a runner came within a two-metre distance 
of a player avatar, the avatar was considered caught and the game was terminated. 
A photograph of the location where the player was caught was then taken and 
posted on a website as a form of documentation (Benford et al. 2004). The runners 
also had a dedicated channel through which they communicated without the players 
being able to hear them. The two city realms, the real and the virtual, were 
correspondent. The virtual city was a simple three-dimensional representation of the 
real area, with some details such as pavement and building structures. The physical 
reality and the virtual one were aligned with each other and the server would update 
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and refresh the locations of the virtually controlled avatars. 
 
The experience of Can You See Me Now? differed depending on whether one was 
a runner in the real city, a player/participant in the gallery space or a spectator 
onlooker in the actual city or gallery, or indeed someone reviewing the documentation 
of the piece. By focusing on the runner and player perspectives, and based 
on accounts and interviews I undertook with performers and audience members, 
I will examine Can You See Me Now? from the perspective of a performative 
experiment with technology that interrogates the role of physical participation in 
the mixed reality landscape. I will examine the way in which the performance 
challenges the cultural shift towards digital and virtual performance of everyday 
life by re-emphasising physical participation and its complex relationship with 
virtual participation. 
 
I propose that the dynamic between engaging through physical participation 
and virtual participation in this work can be related to the dynamic between core 
and extended consciousness in Damasio’s model. Damasio argues that a cohesive 
relationship between core and extended consciousness creates a ‘homeostasis of 
perception’ (2000, 138). The complex relationship between these two levels of 
consciousness only becomes apparent when the homeostasis is thwarted. Arguably, 
Can You See Me Now? thwarts and deconstructs this homeostasis by creating a 
sense of disorientation and mismatch between physical participation and virtual 
participation. The online players, runners and in turn audiences and commentators 
reflect upon the complexities of the mixed reality performance. I will outline some of 
the ways in which this disorientation comes about from the hybrid nature of 
interactions between players/participants and runners in Can You See Me Now? 
before considering how the piece encourages a reflexive stance on some of the 
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cultural and ethical implications of the shift towards digital participation. 
 
THE P LA YER /P ARTI CI P ANT P ERS PE CT IV E  
 
Much like a mainstream online game, the virtual aspect of the player’s experience in 
Can You See Me Now? consisted of a simulation seen on a computer screen through 
which the players interacted with the ‘live’ runners. This engagement was then 
supplemented with the documentation left on the website after the performance was 
over. Other aspects of virtual engagement included the online performance identity 
of individual players as expressed through chats and movements throughout the 
piece. It is clear that the creation of the player’s sense of community was a result of 
the cooperation they experienced by being part of the community of players 
and, I would propose, also a result of them being relocated from a real environment 
into the virtual space. Physically they were inculcated as participants as they sat 
behind their computers engaging with a pervasive game, or through their physical 
presence in the gallery space. Their personal reflections offered a sense of their 
personal trajectory through the event as they became affected by the performance of 
their avatar. 
 
Reflecting on Damasio’s model of core and extended consciousness, one could 
argue that the players’ engagement with the ‘city’ adhered mainly to the mechanisms 
of extended consciousness and higher reason. Avatar identities, micro narratives, 
tactics and strategies were mainly formed as a result of the analysis of virtual objects 
in the city simulation through high-order processing. The lower areas of perception 
comprising primary emotions, background emotions, low-level attention and liferegulating 
functions (Damasio 2000, 55) were not directly affected by the city 
environment, since the players were not physically present in the environment. Any 
effects or affects induced by the game/performance were thus mediated through 
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extended consciousness mechanisms and looped back onto the lower levels of 
core consciousness. 
 
The online players had a very limited interface through which to experience the 
city. Both visually and in terms of the information received online, limited 
information was available on the location. Even though there was no possibility of 
engaging with the actual surroundings to induce an emotional state specific to the 
interaction with that environment, by manipulating the runners into different 
situations the ‘player’ was able to probe the city-scape. Thus the physical bodies of 
the runners became ‘prosthetic’ for the online players who were physically absent in 
the actual environment. The following reflection by Matt Adams, one of the creators 
of Can You See Me Now?, exemplifies this: 
 
I am sat online, playing in my bedroom, 2,500 miles away from where someone is on the 
streets of a city in the rain in an anorak and trainers, running as it gets dark through 
rush-hour traffic. And as I exert pressure with my index finger on the left arrow key and 
turn into the virtual park, this human being is required by the rules of the game to leap 
the hedge into the muddy grass and run up the steep slope through the park to maintain 
this game space. (Adams in Benford and Giannachi 2011, 34) 
 
This passage emphasises the detachment of the player from the performer and the 
fact that this divide can only be ‘bridged’ (constituting a holistic imaginary 
organicity) by means of rationalisation and a secondary emotive loop resulting 
from a visual virtual space and the haptic experience of a keyboard. The level of 
detachment also highlights a discrepancy between virtual reality and the material 
reality of the game that created a sense of a disorienting, fragmented hybrid 
presence. However, the bodies of the runners became a technology through which 
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the real city could be perceived by the players. Unlike a mainstream massive 
multiplayer online role-play game, Can You See Me Now? did not emphasise an 
imaginary embodiment of the avatar but rather a disembodiment and detachment 
from them, drawing attention to the lack of physical participation in the actual city. 
The homeostasis of perception was thwarted and deconstructed by the set-up of the 
pervasive game. This deconstruction created an effect of making explicit the way in 
which mixed reality environments re-calibrate our sensitivities and modes of 
engagement with reality by interrogating the place of embodied experience. 
 
THE RUNN ER P ER SP ECT IV E  
 
The runners engaged with the online ‘virtual city’ through the use of their handheld 
devices and GPS technology. This technology enabled them to have an online 
presence and appear as virtual avatars on computer screens. At the same time, they 
were also physically present in the ‘actual city’ where the performance was taking 
place. Unlike the players, the runners’ engagement with the city did address the 
lower levels of perception, since they were physically present and immersed in the 
environment of the city. All of the runners received substantial training before they 
performed with the players. They devised performative tactics such as the ‘sweep’, 
where they would maintain a line and sweep large portions of a region in the hope of 
catching players out. There was also a sense of group identity and of being beyond 
the physical environment created by the costumes and the ‘advanced’ GPS 
technology (advanced at the time) that distinguished them from common pedestrians. 
What also created the group identity were the rehearsed routines of physical 
movements adopted by the runners. As Damasio suggests, physical interaction with 
the environment can induce background emotions, alertness and low-level attention, 
which combine to become essential emotive layers that constitute core consciousness 
and lie at the basis of constructing a ‘behavioural score’ (2000, 95) – or what 
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Richard Schechner (2002) terms ‘performance flow’. This in turn is an essential 
component in constructing a sense of self and in turn identity. The physical 
interaction with the city thus enabled the runners to create a sense of identity and 
engagement through experiencing core consciousness in ways that the interaction of 
the individual players behind computer screens did not. 
 
The experience was by no means one that would purport to a sense of cohesive 
homeostasis of perception. Despite the training and the fact that the runners were 
accustomed to the technology, the design of the pervasive game purposefully 
interrupted the correspondence between the virtual and the physical city. This 
dislocation was very evident in the performance of Can You See Me Now? in 
Rotterdam in 2003, when the buildings and sites in the virtual city did not exist in the 
real city but were marked by a wire frame mode. As Benford and Giannachi suggest, 
this was done to create an ‘effect of stretching the temporal frame of the game to 
include future designs of the site’ (2011, 33). There were glitches in the way the whole 
system operated, and as a result there were interruptions in the way the GPS and 
WIFI updated the information about the positions of players and runners in the 
game. Online players were mostly unaware of these discrepancies, whilst the runners 
had the advantage of having access to information without any lag or interruptions 
in the flow of data. This knowledge enabled them to attempt error management 
strategies that did not always work, but they were also able to manipulate the game 
situation to their own advantage. Instead of cohesion and integration of the real and 
virtual experiences, there was an open manipulation going on between the players 
and the runners. Runners often cheated or exploited the system, be it through lag or 
data manipulation, in order to catch the players. Conversely, players shared 
information amongst themselves in order to outsmart the runners. Much of this 
manipulation transcended the initial design and architecture of the piece. In that 
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sense, the Rotterdam performance transcended the code ramifications of the project 
and to an extent its very technological basis. The codified framework of the virtual 
city was not in control of the physical environment. On the whole, these 
discrepancies and disorientations exposed and questioned the reliability and 
transparency of the media being employed, bringing forth the notion that maps 
never represent reality accurately. 
 
No matter how accurate and immersive technology becomes, there is always a 
spatial gap and a temporal lag between the simulation and the real world. In Can 
You See Me Now? the virtual city had a somewhat flexible relationship to the real 
city. At times the match between the two cities was almost identical; the virtual and 
the real pavements matched and appeared to be perfectly synchronised. At other 
times there was divergence between the two cities and they appeared to be distant 
from one another. For example, traffic was not present in the virtual city but also at 
times the runners’ and players’ positions were not updating properly. Thus Can You 
See Me Now? engendered an asynchronous gap between time and space. This gap 
exposed the difference between the aforementioned two modes of engagement; one 
that emphasised the processes of core consciousness pertaining to the runners’ 
perspectives and one that emphasised the extended consciousness that was experienced 
from the players’ perspectives. 
 
By exposing the discrepancies between virtual and the physical engagement, 
Can You See Me Now? deconstructed in a philosophical sense the homeostasis of 
perception that is often elicited by mainstream mixed reality environments. This was 
done by making explicit the ways in which mixed reality performances such as Can 
You See Me Now? re-calibrate the sensitivities of physical engagement. Unlike many 
products of contemporary cybernetic culture (such as immersive computer games) 
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that emphasise the experience of extended consciousness in the virtual sphere, 
Can You See Me Now? addressed many layers of the sensory movie-in-the-brain, 
thus reflecting on the cultural impact of this re-calibration through new media 
technologies. 
 
Finally, I would like to look at how Can You See Me Now? addresses some of the 
ethical implications inherent in the aforementioned cultural shift towards the virtual. 
The game has been criticised for inducing a sense of military manipulation, due to its 
use of surveillance and the possibility of manipulating runners into risky situations 
(Benford and Giannachi 2011). At one stage in the game, some of the players 
reported feeling concerned for the runners. After all, their actions were potentially 
placing the runners in situations of considerable physical danger, since the 
performances took place in the middle of busy cities. This notion again emphasises 
a discrepancy between a virtual non-consequential simulation and the real world, 
with the position of a potentially irresponsible voyeur on one side and that of a real 
witness implicated in an event. But there is more at stake here since an ethical 
engagement with an Other may require a direct, immediate experience of reality. 
Emmanuel Lévinas’ concept of the face-to-face encounter with the Other may shed 
some light on this relationship. 
 
Edith Wyschogrod in her discussion of Lévinas’ ethics in art argues that for 
Lévinas ‘ethics is an unmediated relation to the Other’ (Wyschogrod in Peperzak 
1995, 137; emphasis added) because it essentially transcends linguistic and conceptual 
structures by means of a non-linguistic access to the Other. For Lévinas, the 
routes of access or ‘interfaces’ with the Other are essentially non-linguistic. They 
include ‘the human face, an idea of the infinite that exceeds any description of it, 
sensation as a non-cognitive relation of sensing and sensed’ (Wyschogrod in 
16 
 
Peperzak 1995, 137). Drawing on the face-to-face relationship with the Other in 
Lévinas, I will analyse the context of the discrepancy between the physical and the 
virtual in Can You See Me Now? where the gallery participants did not have face-toface 
contact with the players in the city.  
 
According to Lévinas, the face is more than just a sign or a symbol and 
perception of someone’s face in ‘reality’. I would add that the face offers exclusive 
cognitive stimuli that cannot be experienced in a virtual environment, which in 
turn is essential for a fully fledged ethical engagement with the Other. Andrew 
Tallon elaborates on how we might approach the concept of the face-to-face 
relationship with the Other: ‘the reason why the face communicates more 
meaning than itself is that there is an affective co-naturality not between my 
knowing and the other but between my being and the other’ (Tallon in Peperzak 
1995, 111). 
 
What Tallon is arguing is that a face-to-face encounter privileges affective 
responses. This resonates with Damasio’s model where the face-to-face encounter 
would address the layers of core consciousness in which affective responses can be 
directly induced. If we were to apply this concept to the experience of Can You See 
Me Now? by considering the two polar experiences of the physical realm, on the 
one hand, and the virtual realm, on the other, then one could argue that the virtual 
experience will not satisfy the necessary conditions for an unmediated face-to-face 
encounter with the Other and thus compromise the possibility of developing a fully 
ethical dynamic between the players in the gallery and the runners in the city. This 
is because the experience of the performance through the virtual environment is 
predominantly based on semiotic readings of avatars that are signs and symbols on 
a computer screen. There is no direct engagement with the living human beings 
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they represent. The affect, emotions and excitement resulting from the game 
viewed on screen are thus first mediated through the intentional (semiotic) aspect 
of avatars; hence, any affect towards the Other arises from intentional sign systems. 
Obviously there is a physical dimension to the gallery experience as well but that 
is not directly related to the runners and nor does it comprise a face-to-face 
encounter with them. 
 
The players in the gallery therefore have to use their imagination in order to 
contextualise a set of circumstances that would enable them to develop a fuller 
ethical stance towards the runners; however, such imaginations often prove far too 
limited. In contradistinction to this, a face-to-face encounter in the physical realm 
engenders the possibility of immediate response, one where an unmediated relationship 
with the Other may be induced. As Tallon suggested, the ethical dimension of 
the face-to-face encounter is not predicated on the ‘knowing’ of the Others ‘real’ 
circumstances, but rather on the ‘being’ present within the same set of circumstances 
as the Other. Thus, by being denied such an encounter with the runners, the players 
in the gallery were divested of that ‘unmediated’ level of engagement which would 
have enabled them to develop a fuller ethical stance. Lévinas’ theory helps to 
understand how different ontological modes of encountering the Other carry 
different possibilities of ethical engagement. This further expands on the implications 
of the discrepancies between the physical and the virtual in Can You See Me Now? 
and the implications of the cultural shift towards digital social interaction that, as 
I have argued, the piece negotiates. 
 
CONC LU SI ON :  TH E P O ST -V IRTUA L A GE  
 
In this article, neuroscientific theory was used as part of a hybrid methodology for 
performance analysis in order to argue how mixed reality performance questions the 
18 
 
role of physical participation in the new media landscape in terms of cultural and 
ethical implications. This approach also enabled me to consider cognitive and 
neuroscientific theories as ways of understanding subjectivity and participation in 
technologically driven and scientifically inspired new media performance. These 
theoretical approaches prove insightful and appropriate as a means of exploring 
subjectivity in a progressively technologically laden culture since they are often based 
on scientific developments that are technologically driven themselves. Technological 
development thus becomes a discursive context that informs both the analysis of the 
works in question and the theory of the mind that supports it. 
 
Finally, in a speculative bent, I would like to reflect on the future implications of 
some of the issues raised in this article. Even though performances such as Can You 
See Me Now? seem to imply a somewhat sceptical, deconstructive stance, it is 
worthwhile to consider the fact that digital culture has and is still undergoing radical 
changes that will impact the way in which we engage and perceive reality. With the 
advent of ubiquitous computing there is an ever-increasing tendency to perceive 
technology as a transparent, integrated component of everyday life. One example 
would be Google’s ‘experiment’: Google Glass, a post-PC device in the form of 
glasses that overlays an augmented reality directly onto the user’s field of vision in 
real time. Ironically, such attempts at integrating the virtual and the real render the 
virtual an invisible backbone of daily experiences. A more extreme example of the 
emergent post-virtual technology would be the creation of an artificial retina. An 
artificial retina would create a virtual image of the world, allowing, for example, a 
portion of blind people to regain sight. In the case of this integration, from the 
perspective of the user’s daily experience there would no longer be an immediate 
empirical way of making a distinction between the virtual and the real image. Such 
devices would herald the coming of a post-virtual age, where virtual media would no 
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longer strive for transparency but would replace the immediacy of the real by 
replacing the medium of the user’s brain itself. 
 
In many ways, mixed reality performances ask whether it is important to draw 
and consider these distinctions. Are mixed reality performances a sight of resistance 
towards these shifts in digital culture advocating for the value and importance of 
physical participation in everyday life? Or is the craving for ‘natural perception’, 
physical experiences and corporeal perceptions a somewhat outdated, romanticised 
tendency in contemporary arts and criticism? Perhaps such arguments are reflective 
of an ecological turn and are expressive of a romanticised fear of losing one’s 
physical, material ‘origins’ – a particular form of philosophical disavowal. Perhaps a 
more radical direction can be taken, as suggested by the concept of the posthuman 
put forward by Hayles, in which the human and the technological become coupled 
together and it is ‘no longer possible to distinguish meaningfully between the 
biological organism and the informational circuits in which it is enmeshed’ (1999, 35). 
In order to embrace such a posthuman condition, it may be necessary to think outside 
culturally established binary oppositions such as body/technology and materiality/ 
virtuality, and accept the concept of the posthuman as one that is essentially hybrid 
and in a constant process of evolution. Perhaps contemporary performance art and 
the theories of the mind that are driven by technological and scientific development 
will have a future purchase in furthering our understanding of the posthuman 
condition and informing new ways of ‘becoming’ posthuman in a progressively 
digital age. 
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